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PHANTASIES, NEUROTIC-BELIEFS,
AND BELIEFS-PROPER
Linda A. W. Brakel
This paper presents a philosophical analysis of three cognitive states familiar and important to
psychoanalysts—phantasy, neurotic-belief, and belief-proper. It explores the differences
among these three propositional attitudes and finds that the development of secondary process
capacities of reality testing and truth directness out of earlier primary process operations (them-
selves prior to considerations of truth or falsity) plays a crucial role. Difficulties in the proper
typing of cognitive states are discussed, as are the consequences of such confounds. This use
of a philosophical method serves to sharpen the familiar psychoanalytic clinical concepts of
phantasy and neurotic-belief. In addition, these same clinical concepts, once properly speci-
fied, have much to offer the philosophy of mind, where current understanding of representa-
tional cognitive states is restricted to those that are largely conscious and rational. When
psychoanalytic concepts such as phantasy and neurotic-belief can be better integrated within
the discipline of philosophy of mind, both philosophers and psychoanalysts will have a more
complete and adequate theory of mind.
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INTRODUCTION
Beliefs, according to most philosophers of mind, are cognitive states that
take the form of propositional attitudes. But we can recognize three distinct
propositional attitude types, all best considered “beliefs.” Beliefs of the first
type have strict technical criteria that derive from a modern philosophy of
mind viewpoint. Thus, the “beliefs-proper” of this sort are those proposi-
tional attitudes that are reality tested and truth directed. Beliefs-proper are
held or dropped as reality testing brings evidence for or against the belief.
While one can hold a false belief-proper, and thereby believe falsely, one
cannot knowingly do so.
The second type of belief, perhaps best typified by religious beliefs, can-
not be reality tested. As there can never be sufficient evidence accrued to
know this sort of belief as true or false, one can hold it indefinitely, or
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choose to relinquish or even change it, without ones rationality being
called into question. Many widely held ethical and cultural, as well as
popular and everyday beliefs, belong to this category we will call “social-
belief.” In this paper there will not be much to be said about this type of
belief.
“Neurotic-beliefs” comprise the third, and for the psychoanalyst, perhaps
most interesting type of belief. Often fixed and central in our neurotic pa-
tients, these neurotic-beliefs more resemble phantasies than beliefs-proper.
Both phantasies and neurotic-beliefs are propositional attitudes that can be
characterized as primary process in organization, prior to truth considera-
tions, and not reality tested. And yet, because in neurotic-beliefs psychic-
reality based “knowledge” is substituted for knowledge gained by reality
testing in beliefs-proper, neurotic-beliefs are experienced as though they
meet the criteria for beliefs-proper. Not surprisingly then, factual knowl-
edge of the sort that can easily cause beliefs-proper to change has almost
no effect on neurotic-beliefs. This both reaffirms a basic psychoanalytic
technical concept—the need for transference based working through—and
helps explain why cognitive behavioral therapies (as well as those of our
interpretative efforts, which consist merely in sharing facts) often prove dis-
appointing.
In addition to providing some understanding of the above practical mat-
ters, a serious effort to classify propositional attitudes like phantasies, be-
liefs-proper, and neurotic-beliefs—a main goal of this paper—can afford
psychoanalysts other advantages. By clearly defining and classifying some
of the concepts central to clinical psychoanalytic phenomena, concepts
such as neurotic-belief and phantasy, and by investigating how these pri-
mary process organized states differ from beliefs-proper, a method bor-
rowed from philosophy can enhance psychoanalytic understanding.1 Just
as important, everyday psychoanalytic conceptualization can add consider-
ably to the philosophy of mind, where it is commonly held that most repre-
sentational mental states (i.e., mental states with contents), must be rational
mental states.2 (See Cherniak, 1981; Davidson, 1970/1980a, 1973/1980b,
1974/1980c, 1975/1984, 1982; Dennett, 1978, 1987; Fodor, 1975, 1986;
and Stich, 1983. These philosophers are meaning holists who do allow for
the occasional irrational contentful mental state, but only in the context of
generalized normative rationality.) Because in our work as psychoanalysts
we have routine and fluid access to various primary process mediated men-
tal states, states that are anything but rare, we can uniquely participate in
the effort to understand cognitive states, conative propositional attitudes,
and mental states in general. We can be psychoanalytic clinicians and
make psychoanalytic contributions to a theory of mind.
In order to do this in a systematic fashion, we need to be clear about
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the differences among phantasies, beliefs-proper, and the more complex
category of neurotic-beliefs. I begin with a few examples of neurotic-beliefs.
THREE SAMPLE CASES OF NEUROTIC-BELIEF FROM AN ORDINARY
PSYCHOANALYTIC MORNING
I hope to demonstrate two points with these three examples. First, al-
though neurotic-beliefs do not meet the criteria (to be elaborated at length
below) for beliefs-proper at all, they are subjectively experienced no differ-
ently from beliefs-proper. Second, the phenomenon of experiencing neu-
rotic-beliefs as beliefs-proper is so ubiquitous it can be demonstrated with
almost any psychoanalytic patient in any hour. That said, I will discuss my
first three patients on the day I wrote the first draft of this section of the
paper.
My first patient, Dr. A, a 50-year-old administrator of a multispecialty
medical clinic, began the session lamenting her lack of authority. She was
aware that her voice was tremulous, and she complained that her clothes
were nondescript and her overall appearance mousy. She felt terrible, as
though she was someone in hiding. We recognized these as familiar com-
plaints. They arose from her acting on her neurotic-belief that there was
just one way to prevent a present day recurrence of the very damaging
sexual behavior her father engaged in with her when she was between the
ages of 3 and 9—that way was to be always hidden and unappealing so
that all men would keep their distance. “Evidence” of various sorts for this
neurotic-belief was brought to bear. There was the objective knowledge
that her current behavior has in fact led to no inappropriate sexual relation-
ships, although unfortunately no satisfying ones either. Then, with respect
to the past, there was some psychic-reality based “knowledge.” Dr. A
“knew” that since neither her neglected and hence disheveled sister nor
her chronically psychotic mother seemed to attract her father in the same
way, she, who had been a sparkly 3-year-old much desiring her father’s
affection, must have been responsible for her father’s acts. So she “knew”
she should have made herself hidden and unappealing then, too, and neu-
rotically believed she had best remain that way now. Dr. A experienced
these neurotic-beliefs as beliefs-proper, and she acted on them as one
would beliefs-proper. But they are not beliefs-proper—not even false ones.
They are more like complex phantasies, central to her neurotic problem;
phantasies in which the reality-based evidence seeking and consequent
knowledge involved with beliefs-proper is replaced by a façade of psychic-
reality based “knowledge.”
My second patient, Dr. B, is a 35-year-old family practitioner. He holds
a neurotic-belief that he is unattractive, physically and emotionally. So Dr.
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B took the better part of this session to recount an impressively long list of
friends, colleagues, patients, and persons who were potential love interests,
all of whom had, via phone, e-mail, regular mail, or directly, complimented
him on his looks and/or qualities of character. We were used to this; he
commented that he was still trying to reality test by amassing evidence to
counter his standard view of himself. But, we both realized this endeavor,
no matter how many times repeated, would likely be close to useless. It
was mere reality-tested knowledge, which had no sway with Dr. B’s psy-
chic-reality “knowledge.” Again, what Dr. B experienced is a neurotic-be-
lief not a belief-proper. Therefore, he will not drop it even when much
evidence-based knowledge shows it to be false.
Patient three, Dr. C, a 30-year-old married man, was intermittently in-
tense or withdrawn in his relationship with his wife. Owing to a very recent
and acrimonious fight they had, we learned that whenever she felt her need
for space compromised (as she often did), he felt her reject him with much
force. He could not tolerate being excluded by her and felt the need to
make it right immediately, which was of course impossible. Dr. C next had
the following associations. Yesterday, after the session, he had been able
to think about our work together for some 15 minutes after the session. He
realized that, although remarkable, rarely had he had any thoughts what-
ever about his analysis between sessions. In fact, he stopped his work about
a minute before the end of each hour. Today we were able to understand
why he withdrew before I ended each session and why he stayed with-
drawn until we began the next one. This behavior owed to a neurotic-belief
that my stopping each hour constituted a rejection and that rather than
live through the 24 hours or so until our next appointment, he made our
relationship nonexistent. I speculated, too (although not yet with my pa-
tient), that the revival of our relationship every day was important in terms
of one of his most central and wishful phantasies, namely that his relation-
ship with his long dead mother could likewise be revived so regularly and
so easily. When I do make this interpretation, I will likely talk in terms of
my patient “acting as though he believes” that the dead-then-alive cycle in
the analytic hours is something that he can re-create with his mother,
thereby bringing her back to life, if only temporarily. I will make the inter-
pretation without expecting a change in my patient’s thinking, either on the
basis of reality-based knowledge about the nature of death or on what will
be his new knowledge that he actually entertains such an idea. Yet, I will
comment to Dr. C in terms of “acting as though he believes,” because he
will not experience the contents of such a neurotic-belief in any different
way from how he would experience the contents of a belief-proper, or a
social-belief for that matter.
But as with Drs. A and B, mental contents of Dr. C’s neurotic-beliefs
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are different; both from contents in social beliefs, which need admit of no
evidential modifications, and from contents in beliefs-proper, which must
be reality tested and rendered true or false. Rather, for all three patients,
the contents of the neurotic-beliefs discussed here are among the important
components of each patient’s core phantasies. Not that phantasies are the
same as neurotic-beliefs. Phantasies (as I will discuss at greater length be-
low) are primary process based and prior to considerations of reality testing
and truth vs. falsity. Neurotic-beliefs are composed of one or more phantas-
ies, plus psychic-reality based “knowledge” that provides confirming “evi-
dence” for the phantasies’ content. (Neurotic-beliefs can be considered
“phantasies-plus.”) The following analogy might clarify this further: phan-
tasies bear the same relationship to a neurotic-belief—which needs its
façade of rationality; as latent dream wishes do to a secondarily revised
manifest dream—which needs its secondary process façade. Of course,
phantasies—including the sort of structured, complex, partly unconscious,
multileveled and multidetermined type of phantasy described in these three
patients—are quite different from beliefs-proper. Just how they are different
and why they are different are of central importance and will be addressed
forthwith.3
DEFINITIONS OF BELIEF-PROPER AND PHANTASY
In philosophical terms, a belief-proper is that type of propositional atti-
tude that aims at the truth (see Velleman, 1998). Thus, Dr. A cannot have
the belief-proper, “it is time for my session to end” unless she ascertains
that the particular set of conditions by which this proposition would be
true—namely that this session started at 6:45 a.m. and it is now 7:30
a.m.—obtains. What this amounts to, in more familiar terms, is that the
contents of beliefs-proper are specified with respect to time and place and
that belief-proper contents are always (and ever) subjected to reality testing.
She can maintain her belief-proper that it is time for the session to end
now, 1/15/99, at 7:30 a.m. in Ann Arbor, even when she remembers that
it is 5:30 a.m. in Colorado where she grew up. On the other hand, if Dr. A
has the belief-proper that the session will momentarily end, but consults
her watch (which is in good working order) to find that it is 7:10 a.m., she
will no longer hold the belief-proper that the session is about to end. Actu-
ally, since the belief-proper that the session will be ending now would,
under these conditions, entail a contradiction, she can no longer hold this
belief—at least not as a belief-proper. Obviously, she can still desire, wish,
or phantasize that the session were ending; any of these may have had a
causal role in the initial, but now known to be false, belief. But, what Dr.
A cannot do is hold the belief-proper that the session will end now, while
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knowing that it will not. From the above, it should already be apparent that
beliefs-proper are propositional attitudes that, in psychoanalytic terms, are
examples of secondary process mentation; they are each grounded in a
particular time and place, they are all reality tested, and they never admit
of contradictions. All of this requires some cognitive sophistication and ma-
turity.
Phantasies are quite different from beliefs-proper. From a philosophical
perspective the difference is appreciated in that phantasies are character-
ized as those propositional attitudes in which there is no attempt to match
the truth conditions of the proposition to what obtains in the world (see
Brakel, in press.) Thus, if Dr. A has longed for a break from the work of her
analysis, she might phantasize “It is at least 7:30 a.m. now in Ann Arbor,
and this session will very soon end for today.”4 without any consideration
of the actual time. Further even if she’s made aware that the time in Ann
Arbor is now only 7:10 a.m., her phantasy that it is at least 7:30 a.m. can
remain her phantasy. This example demonstrates both that phantasies, un-
like beliefs-proper, can admit of contradictions and that phantasies are dif-
ferent from beliefs-proper with respect to time and place specifications.
Whereas with beliefs-proper, particulars of time and space play central if
not starring roles; with phantasies, time and space specifications are rele-
gated to roles of no more importance than those of undifferentiated extras.
Thus, Dr. A can phantasize that her drive away from my office, which will
occur at 7:35 a.m., is happening right now or that since it would be the
case that if she were in Paris it would be around 1:15 p.m., many hours
past her session, she, therefore, is in Paris—or that Ann Arbor is on Paris
time, or that Ann Arbor is a new division of Paris. Moreover, not only can
phantasies (as those above) be inconsistent with one another, each phan-
tasy can be internally contradictory even within itself. Thus, Dr. A can phan-
tasize that she is working in her psychoanalytic session now and that at the
very same time she is taking a break from psychoanalysis, enjoying the Paris
afternoon. If Dr. A should happen to become aware of the contradiction
and want to “correct” it, she can create a phantasy with a condensation:
she can phantasize, for example, us together in Paris, analyzing but also
having a break from analysis. Clearly, in psychoanalytic terms, phantasies,
even the conscious phantasies of adults, conform much more to primary
process type mentation. Phantasies are not reality tested; they do not rely
on time and place specifications, instead taking place in the “tenseless and
unexamined present” (see Brakel, in press); and they admit of contradic-
tions (or primary process condensation “correction” for contradictions)
readily.
What if we apply these criteria for belief-proper to the neurotic-beliefs of
my patients? Take first that beliefs-proper must be specified in terms of time
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and place. Dr. A has a neurotic-belief that the way to stop men (who all
are equivalent to her father) from engaging in inappropriate sexual relations
with her is to make herself into a mousy hidden person. This is a proposi-
tional attitude in which the present is confused with the past. While being
a less appealing little girl might (questionably) have deterred her father’s
pathological sexual interests, being a mousy woman will do nothing to stop
what was in the past and will do nothing to prevent current-day sexual
assaulters. Yet, Dr. A’s neurotic-belief functions more like a phantasy; it
operates in a tenseless and unexamined present. Now what about the real-
ity-testing criterion that beliefs-proper do not admit of contradictions? Dr.
B’s case demonstrates that even though he accepts evidence that he is an
attractive person contrary to his neurotic-belief that he is not attractive, his
neurotic-belief remains every bit as fixed.
PRELIMINARY DEVELOPMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
If it is correct to categorize beliefs-proper as examples of secondary pro-
cess mentation, then the capacity to hold beliefs-proper necessitates that
any holder of such has achieved a great deal of cognitive development.
After all, the capacity for secondary process mental operations requires
much of thinkers. Mental contents need to be specified in terms of a partic-
ular time and a particular place. Contradictions must be appreciated, then
not tolerated. Finally, the state of affairs obtaining in the world must be
matched with the set of truth conditions that can make specific propositions
true. In psychoanalytic terms, these capacities constitute the general ability
to test reality.
Because phantasies are propositional attitudes of a primary process na-
ture, they do not require as much cognitive sophistication. In fact, young
children can have contentful5 phantasies well before any consideration of
truth vs. falsity, any constraining time variables, any attempt to test reality,
and any notion of contradiction. Phantasies are phantasized not just by the
very young not yet capable of beliefs-proper. Phantasies are also phantas-
ized by cognitively mature adults. When an adult has a phantasy, the adult
has consciously or unconsciously suspended the need to specify time and
place and to exclude contradictions and in so doing, no longer tests reality.
Thus, a phantasy is marked either by the developmental incapacity for, or
the suspension of, these interrelated abilities. That this is unique to phantas-
izing among the cognitive propositional attitude types becomes apparent
as we look not only at phantasy vs. belief-proper but at several other propo-
sitional attitude types, including hypothesizing, supposing, imagining, and
pretending.
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Each of these others, even pretending, depends on the capacity for as-
sessing truth conditions of the proposition in question, and the related ca-
pacity for ascertaining whether these truth conditions have been met so
that the proposition can be judged as true or false. In psychoanalytic terms,
even pretending is preceded by the exercise of secondary process reality
testing (including time and place orientation) with regard to matching what
is pretended with conditions obtaining in the world. Thus, Dr. C, who with
his young son, pretends to be a dinosaur in the dinosaur age, cannot really
pretend this without the prior background understanding that he is a human
father in the post-dinosaur era.6 Imagining is a thought-dominated type of
pretending of which there are two forms. The first is a straightforward men-
tal pretending in which, for example, Dr. C cannot imagine spreading his
wings and taking flight unless he understands he is a flightless bipedal crea-
ture with two arms and no wings. In this type of imagining, just as is the
case with pretending, what he suspends is not the capacity for reality testing
and truth vs. falsity assessment, but the outcome of these operations after
they’ve been performed. In the other type of imagining, although there is
no suspension of reality-testing capacities, tests of reality have not yet been
performed, and one may even choose not to perform them. Thus, I can
imagine that X, my former supervisor, is at the gym today, without check-
ing, and whether or not it is the case that X is at the gym.7 Pretending and
both types of imagining are very different from phantasizing, because in
phantasizing the very capacities for truth/falsity assessment, time/space as-
signment, and reality testing are either not yet in place or are suspended.
Further, in phantasizing the suspension can take place either under one’s
conscious direction or unconsciously, whereas with pretending and imag-
ining reality-testing operations (or products thereof) are actively and con-
sciously put to the side.
Supposing and hypothesizing are even more sophisticated with respect
to truth and reality testing. With supposing, the truth conditions of the prop-
osition and the world are stipulated as matching—the supposition is taken-
as-true—without emphasis on investigation of whether or not it is true.
Propositions are supposed-true for some purpose, for example, in order to
further an exploration, make an argument, continue a discussion, and so
forth. The capacity to test reality is quite intact. However, reality testing is
put off, with the truth of the proposition presumed temporarily in order to
further some more pressing goal. With hypothesizing some proposition to
be true, there is not only the presupposition that the hypothesizer has intact
capabilities for assessing truth and falsity and reality testing but also that
he/she has a serious interest in the truth status of the proposition in ques-
tion. The hypothesizer is concerned with getting things right about the
proposition and its relation to affairs of the world. He/she has perhaps per-
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formed some reality testing operations already. And, the hypothesizer will
likely be interested in the outcome of other, more definitive tests.
A TWO-STAGE DEVELOPMENT OF TWO REALITY-TESTING SKILLS
By examining these different propositional attitudes, we can see that a
two-stage cognitive development with respect to truth assessment and real-
ity testing takes place. The capacity for phantasizing marks the first stage
in the development of propositional attitudes with truly representational,
referring mental content (see Brakel, in press). Phantasizing, the earliest in
the series of propositional attitude, does not require the capacity to test
reality, to provide time/place specifications, nor to discern truth from non-
truth. Phantasies take place before such reality constraints can be appreci-
ated and before the difference between truth and nontruth can be consid-
ered. Not so with beliefs-proper, and not so with the other propositional
attitudes alluded to, including pretending and imagining, the two types with
which phantasies are often confused. Unlike phantasies, pretendings and
imaginings are propositional attitudes belonging to the second stage of de-
velopment. Here, contrasts between the situations pretended and those in
the world are registered, and there must be the ability to assess the match
between truth conditions of the particular propositions pretended and the
particular affairs obtaining in the world. This is true reality testing, a skill
(more properly a collection of skills) necessary for genuine pretending or
imagining.8 That the outcome of the reality tests is overruled, or the opera-
tions of reality testing suspended, owes to the fact that there are, for the
person pretending/imagining, aims more important than reality testing and
truth assessment—e.g., affect discharge, practice of skills, fun.
There is another reality-testing skill differentiating those who can pretend
and imagine from those who can but phantasize. Unlike phantasizers,
imaginers and pretenders are aware that they are imagining or pretending.
Thus, to pretend or imagine some content requires not just a grasping of
that content but an awareness that one is engaging that content within the
cognitive activity of pretending or imagining. This amounts to the under-
standing that imaginers and pretenders have that they are engaged in prop-
ositional attitudes different from having beliefs-proper.
Supposing propositions to be true builds on the cognitive skills devel-
oped in imagining and pretending. The awareness that one is supposing X
to be true rather than having the belief-proper that X is true is a necessary
condition for supposition. It allows the supposer, a thinker fully capable of
ordinary reality testing, to circumvent the usual tests of the matches be-
tween world and propositional truth conditions and, due to some goal more
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pressing than truth assessment, provisionally ascribe truth to an untested
proposition.9 Hypothesizing requires at least as much cognitive sophistica-
tion as does supposing. This is so with respect to differentiating the various
propositional attitude types and with respect to matching truth conditions
of propositions with states of affairs in the world. Unlike all the other propo-
sitional attitude types examined, only hypothesizing shares with holding
beliefs-proper the goal of aiming at the truth. When a proposition is hypoth-
esized-true from the hypothesizer’s viewpoint, however, more tests need to
be applied before the proposition can be held as a belief-proper and be-
lieved-true.
Let’s return to my three patients and their neurotic-beliefs. Since they
experience them as beliefs-proper, it is clear that they do not regard them
as different in propositional attitude type from other beliefs-proper. On the
other hand, it is my contention that their neurotic-beliefs really are more
correctly typed as phantasies, or better yet, what I’d like to call “phantasies-
plus.” Phantasies-plus are phantasies added to by the “evidence” for them
supplied by psychic-reality. This activity of evidence seeking and the
“knowledge” accrued contribute to the subjective experience of neurotic-
beliefs as true beliefs-proper. My aim is to support this contention in the
sections to follow.
CONNECTIONS WITH THE CONATIVE PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES:
WISHES AND DESIRES
So far we’ve been looking at the cognitive capacities sufficient for phan-
tasies as compared with the more advanced cognitive capacities necessary
for beliefs-proper. Reality testing consisting of matching world truth condi-
tion with propositional truth conditions, the ascription of truth vs. nontruth,
and the ability to classify the type of propositional attitude one is employ-
ing—all of these capacities absent in phantasizing, but present (at least to
some extent) in pretending and imagining, and fully operative in supposing,
hypothesizing, and holding beliefs-proper—are capacities characteristic of
secondary process mentation. But how do the conative propositional atti-
tudes of wishing and desiring fit here? Although it might be obvious that
wishes belong with phantasies and beliefs belong with desires, the criteria
we used to distinguish between the two stages of development in the cogni-
tive propositional attitudes will not be of much use here. Wishes can be
contradictory, they are impervious to constraints of reality testing, and truth
conditions for these propositions don’t even make sense. One cannot say,
for instance, that the content of a wish is true or not true. All of this is no
less true for desires. I can desire to be an eager, fresh eight-year-old again,
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fully knowing it will never happen. Further, I can desire to be eight years
old again and, at the same time, desire to be as wise and knowledgeable
and old as the most senior analyst.
However, before we abandon these familiar criteria, let’s note that some
of the very same secondary process capacities—the many aspects of reality
testing for example—are very often used by desirers to evaluate their de-
sires in a few dimensions. When someone has a desire, he/she recognizes
it as the type of conative propositional attitude it is,10 and then, in conjunc-
tion with assessing what obtains in the world, he/she develops some
notion of whether or not the desire can be realistically fulfilled and by what
means. People use beliefs-proper about what obtains in the world to at-
tempt to fulfill their desires. For an everyday example, suppose Dr. B gets
a message from his secretary that an old friend from out of town is here in
Ann Arbor for one day only and wants to meet him at 2 p.m. Suppose
further that on this day Dr. B has a full load of patients scheduled, and his
analytic appointment is at 2 p.m. He has, given the realities of time and
space, what amounts to contradictory desires: to meet his friend at 2 p.m.
and to see his analyst at 2 p.m. By having various consistent beliefs-proper,
he can choose a course of action to attempt to maximize the fulfillment of
both of these desires, albeit one at a time. Suppose he has a belief-proper
that despite his secretary’s message about his friend’s specific availability,
his friend is usually rather flexible about time. Or suppose he remembers
that his analyst occasionally has been able to reschedule on short notice,
so that he has the belief-proper that she might be able to now. Dr. B can
put these beliefs-proper to the test and try to rearrange one of the 2 p.m.
meetings. On the other hand, suppose Dr. B held a different belief-proper
about his friend, namely, that although possessing many good qualities, he
is given to playing stupid jokes on people. Or suppose Dr. B noted that his
secretary has been making a lot of mistakes in taking phone messages
lately. In neither of these last two cases would he have a sufficient set of
beliefs-proper to warrant changing his original schedule, despite really de-
siring to see his friend.
The situation with wishes and phantasies is much different. Wishes seek
fulfillment, too. But in the realm of phantasies they achieve a type of fulfill-
ment unlike that discussed just above. For example, Dr. C wishes to be
male and female. In his phantasy he is two: one who is male and one who
is female. He has two other separate phantasies: one where he is male and
another where he (she) is female. There is no problem that the first phantasy
is internally inconsistent and that the two subsequent ones are inconsistent
with one another. There is no problem that both of these wishes are impos-
sible given the real world of earth physics and human biology. In these
phantasies, his wishes are experienced (phantasized) as fulfilled.
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BELIEFS-PROPER, UNLIKE PHANTASIES, MUST BE SEPARABLE
FROM DESIRES AND WISHES
There is another important difference between beliefs-proper and desires
on the one hand, and phantasies and wishes on the other—a difference in
which the two-stage development concerning primary process vs. second-
ary process capacities is central. Beliefs-proper must be held (or dropped)
irrespective of desires (and wishes), according instead to what conditions
obtain in the world. No matter how much she desires to be in Paris, when
Dr. A. sees a university building from my office window she must hold the
belief-proper that she is seeing a part of the University of Michigan in Ann
Arbor, not the Sorbonne in Paris. And, no matter how appealing Dr. C
would find it to be both male and female, no matter how he wishes for
such an omnipotent state, the real-world evidence that he is a man necessi-
tates that he cannot hold the content “I am male and female” as a belief-
proper. He can wish that this were so, he can phantasize that it is so, but
he cannot hold a belief-proper that he is male and female as there is much
reality-tested real-world evidence to the contrary.11 On the other hand,
there is no need whatsoever for phantasies to be separable from wishes. In
fact, it is reasonable to wonder if phantasies can even exist without embed-
ded wishes. Could Dr. C have a phantasy of being male and female without
it representing some sort of wish or set of wishes?
To be capable of having those cognitive propositional states (i.e., beliefs-
proper) that are entirely separate from conative prepositional states (i.e.,
wishes and desires), it is required that secondary process mediated reality
testing has developed sufficient stability that it will be maintained even
under the pressures of primary process wishes to override it. A lovely exam-
ple of reality testing that is not so sturdy comes from an experiment with
chimps reported in the journal Science. (The work was done by Sarah
Boysen at Ohio State University as reported by Fishman, 1993) Chimps
were trained until each had the ability to recognize plastic Arabic numerals
1–10 and to associate these numerals with the number of items indicated.
This ability, including the understanding of more vs. fewer items was dem-
onstrated as follows. There was an initial training on numerals and their
associated amounts. One chimp then had several runs in which she was
given a choice of two plastic numerals, for example, a 4 and an 8—with
one of the numerals to represent the number of gumdrops she herself would
get and the other to represent the number of food bits for her partner, an-
other chimp. One numeral was always higher than the other. The selecting
chimp picked the higher plastic numeral first (e.g., 8), got rewarded with
eight gumdrops, and then watched her partner chimp get the four gumdrops
represented by the remaining plastic 4. Next, a new and more complicated
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condition was introduced for two chimps, Sarah the selecting chimp and
Sheba, her partner. Now the experimenters repeatedly gave Sheba the num-
ber of gumdrops matching the numeral Sarah chose first. Thus, when Sarah
choose the plastic 7, Sheba got seven gumdrops and Sarah herself was left
with the plastic 3 and three gumdrops. After a number of such trials Sarah
had no trouble picking the lower valued plastic numeral first, thereby re-
serving for herself the higher numeral and the larger number of gumdrops
represented. From the experimenters’ view (really from any view) the learn-
ing experiment was a great success. But, a control condition is of interest
for our purposes. When instead of the plastic numerals the experimenters
used two piles with differing numbers of gumdrops—for example, four
gumdrops vs. eight gumdrops—Sarah, the chimp flawlessly making the
plastic numeral selections so as to increase her own gumdrop reward,
could not learn to forestall choosing the pile with more gumdrops first.
Presumably an easier task in that no association of numeral with number is
required, Sarah could not help but choose the pile with more gumdrops
first—even after seeing that again and again Sheba got the big gumdrop
pay off. It seems she could not stop the wish for more food from interfering
with aspects of her reality-testing capacities. She could not separate her
belief-proper that she would get the bigger pile if and only if she first
pointed to the smaller pile, from her desire for as much food as possible
right now!
Back in the human world, the neurotic-beliefs of my three patients are
also not independent of wishes and desires. Dr. A’s neurotic-belief that her
hidden, nondescript appearance will ward off inappropriate sexual ad-
vances past and present cannot be separated from her wish and desire that
such a presentation to the world would have had a protective effect in the
past and would have that effect now. Also, her neurotic-belief that she was
responsible for her father’s sexual behavior toward her, painful though it is,
is admixed with the wish that her father’s behavior was under her control
all along—her wish that she wasn’t, isn’t, and won’t be helpless. Similarly,
Dr. C’s neurotic-belief that I stop the sessions intending to reject him cannot
exist: (1) without his concurrent wish (and preemptive action) to be the one
who stops our relationship; and (2) without the older wish (on which the
present-day wish and behavior are predicated) never to have felt and never
to feel again the pain of being abandoned by his mother.
THE REALM OF ACTION: DESIRES/BELIEFS-PROPER VS. WISHES/PHANTASIES
So far three important differences between phantasies and beliefs-proper
have been discussed. First, the conditions under which the contents of be-
liefs-proper are true or false must be assessed with respect to conditions in
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the world. This reality-testing skill is not required for phantasies. Second,
having a belief-proper necessitates being capable of properly typing it a
belief-proper. No such capability for distinguishing and correctly typing
propositional attitudes is required for phantasies. Third, beliefs-proper must
be able to be assessed with independence from attendant desires and wis-
hes. A belief-proper must be retained or dropped based only on matches
between its content and the state of affairs obtaining in the world. This is
not required for phantasies.
The significance of these three differences becomes highlighted when we
consider the realm of action. It is also in the realm of action that the subjec-
tive experience of neurotic-belief as no different from that of belief-proper
becomes problematic. Suppose in her analytic hour Dr. A becomes aware
that she desires a tissue. If she has the belief-proper that the box of tissues
in my consulting room is not empty, she will act and reach for a tissue. If,
however, she has the belief-proper that the box is empty, she will not act.
Further, if she even just imagines, supposes, or hypothesizes that the box
has tissues, because so small an outlay is involved in this case, she will
probably reach for the tissue box without further investigation. She will
probably do this even realizing that she has only imagined, supposed, or
hypothesized tissues being available. But, if getting a tissue involved leav-
ing the consulting room and going to my waiting room, if she’s merely
imagined, supposed, or hypothesized tissues there, she probably would at-
tempt to accrue further evidence (i.e., by asking me if there are some tissues
in the waiting room) before interrupting her session. What about pretend-
ing? Dr. A, under some circumstances (e.g., in order to dramatize something),
could merely pretend she had gotten a tissue; she could pretend to use it,
too, knowing full well the pretend functioning of the pretend tissue would
serve a different purpose from real use of the real thing. Finally, Dr. A could
have a phantasy that there is a tissue in the tissue box, either knowing she’s
phantasizing or not realizing it. If she’s aware of merely phantasizing, she
may or may not act. After all, even though phantasies are prior to considera-
tions of truth or falsity, mature thinkers know that sometimes phantasies just
happen to be true. If her phantasy is of the type where she does not experi-
ence it as a phantasy, she’s even more likely to reach for the tissue and start
to use it, her actions unconstrained by reality. The example is certainly a
mundane one, almost sure to have no important consequences. But let’s re-
turn now to the neurotic-beliefs of my three patients.
Neurotic-beliefs, I have claimed, should not be considered beliefs-
proper, but instead phantasies-plus—where the “plus” stands for evidence
sought on the basis of psychic-reality and then action based on the resultant
knowledge. Thus, while the contents of neurotic-beliefs resemble the con-
tents of primary process mediated phantasies, they are experienced as be-
liefs-proper in large part due to the operation of the psychic-reality based
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search for evidence and due to the resultant knowledge. The mistyping of
neurotic-beliefs as beliefs-proper then allows neurotic-beliefs to lead to ac-
tions with very troubling consequences.
Dr. A’s neurotic-belief that she must stay mousy leads her to act so as to
actualize this. Consequent to these actions, her life is without the pleasures
of male friends, companions, and lovers. Dr. B’s neurotic-belief that he is
not attractive as a person, physically and emotionally, is painful. In fact, so
painful that he is driven to spend much of his waking time collecting people
who think well of him in the hope of eventually disconfirming his en-
trenched neurotic-belief. But, his neurotic-belief driven actions and behav-
iors, meanwhile, are clearly to the detriment of other actions and behaviors,
which could lead to the type of satisfying relationships for which he longs.
Dr. C’s neurotic-belief that I reject him every day in ending the sessions
also leads him to actions—namely the anticipatory counterattack actions
of terminating our relationship and ceasing all thoughts about his analysis
from one minute before the end of every session until our work and rela-
tionship are revived the next day. These actions may jeopardize the very
analysis and certainly do diminish its effectiveness.
FURTHER DEVELOPMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
In the last two sections we have taken up first, the necessity for the sepa-
ration of beliefs-proper (but not phantasies) from desires and wishes, and
second, the special relationship between beliefs-proper and action. Both of
these matters are closely related to the two reality-testing skills—(1) match-
ing propositional truth conditions with world conditions, and (2) properly
ascribing mental content to its cognitive state type—discussed above. To
consolidate the various factors required for the two stage development
yielding the capacity for genuine beliefs-proper, let’s propose that beliefs-
proper must meet four criteria: (1) there must be a matching of the truth
conditions of their content with those that obtain for the world (reality test-
ing one); (2) there must be a proper typing of the mental content in beliefs-
proper as beliefs-proper (reality testing two); (3) beliefs-proper must be held
(or dropped) independent from simultaneous desires and wishes; and (4)
beliefs-proper, because of meeting the three criteria listed just above, bear
a particular relationship to actions. To appreciate more fully these four fac-
tors, let us now examine various cognitive states (propositional attitudes)
during dreaming in these terms.
COGNITIVE STATES IN DREAMS, INCLUDING DREAM-BELIEFS
The adult dream world contains many of the cognitive states of the adult
waking world, but within the dream. When an adult dreams, the dreamer
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experiences him- or herself as believing, imagining, pretending, supposing,
perceiving, remembering, and so forth. But, these dream-beliefs (and
dream-perceivings, etc.) cannot really meet the criteria to be considered
beliefs-proper (or veridical perceptions, etc.). Although within the dream
the dream-beliefs’ contents presumably have been reality tested against
what obtains in the world, the world is a dream world and the reality testing
often lacks the secondary process mediated sophistication and consistency
of awake world reality testing. For example, here is a dream of convenience
(Freud, 1900–1901/1962a, p. 125) I had in medical school. “I hear a loud
clanging. I don’t understand what it means but feel compelled to get up
and go to the delivery room and assist, and so I go.” When I awakened I
realized that in the dream I believed myself to have been present in the
delivery room, when in actuality I was still in my “on-call” bed. In the
awake state I also understood that the loud clanging, incomprehensible in
my dream, had been my pager ringing, summoning me to the delivery room
as the on-call medical student for the obstetrics service. Reality testing even
within the dream was off, and since in my dream I believed I had left for
the delivery room, while in fact I slept soundly and dreamt, it is clear that
my dream-belief did not help me match the truth conditions of the belief
with those of the world.
Deviating from tests of reality in an even more striking way is the follow-
ing. Dreamers are incorrect when they, within their dreams, experience
themselves to be having the belief-proper type of propositional attitude.
Instead, dreamers are dreaming and believing-within-the-dream, that is,
having dream-beliefs. But, the great majority of dreamers in the great major-
ity of dreams do not experience themselves as dreaming and therefore they
cannot properly identify the type of propositional attitude they employ.
Things do change as soon as the dreamer awakens. Once awake, most of
the cognitive states and propositional states of the dream can be properly
ascribed. So, the dreamer can then say, “That memory of X in the dream,
was just as I do remember X.” But, the dreamer can also say, “That memory
of Z in the dream was very different from any actual memory of Z.” With
respect to dream-beliefs, too, they can match (awake) beliefs-proper or not.
The standard of comparison always comes from actual belief-proper. A
dreamer, now awake, can say, “In my dream I believed that your hair was
very long and green. Now, I still have the belief-proper that it is long, but
of course it is not green.”
Shevrin (1986) and I (Brakel, 1989) debated about the role of conscious-
ness in the ability to discern the various types of cognitive states and propo-
sitional attitudes, one from the other. Shevrin held that being conscious of
some mental content, whether it be in a dream, hallucination, or during
alert awakeness, was sufficient to ascribe (and then fix) the content to a
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particular cognitive state type (e.g., as a memory, perception, belief, wish,
or an imagination, etc.). I, on the other hand, held that one’s being con-
scious of some content was necessary, but that the ascribing and fixing
within a type required alert awake consciousness. Dream-percepts and
dream-beliefs make good counterexamples to Shevrin’s claim. The mental
content experienced as a visual percept in a dream might well have never
been a percept. It can, for example, have had its origin as a memory or a
daydream. As for a belief within a dream: (1) it may fail even the question-
able reality tests applicable within primary process dominated dreams, (2)
it may reflect no waking belief-proper past or present of the dreamer, and
(3) it cannot be properly identified within the dream as a dream-belief
rather than a belief-proper. True, once awake from a dream or in a posthal-
lucinatory state, people can (most often) properly (re) type the contents they
had experienced as dream or hallucinatory contents in various cognitive
state/propositional attitude forms. Yet, even the grossest distinction—that
between contents originating in a dream or hallucination vs. those originat-
ing in awake perceptions, memories, or beliefs—takes place only during
alert consciousness. Certainly, the finer discriminations that separate
dream-percepts from awake percepts, and awake percepts from awake im-
ages imagined and those remembered, will require alert awakeness. To
demonstrate, here is a simple example. I had a dream in which I believed
X to have broken his leg. When I awakened I realized X had not broken
his leg. Indeed, only in the subsequent alert wakeful condition did I prop-
erly type the dream-belief as having been a dream-belief. Further, only in
alert wakefulness could I consider the dream-belief as revealing my phan-
tasy (likely wishful) of a broken legged X underlying and motivating the
dream-belief.
This dream example provides another reason for revisiting the debate
between Shevrin and me. That the correct typing of the dream content can
occur only after the dream, in the alert wakeful condition, demonstrates
that properly distinguishing among various cognitive states and proposi-
tional attitudes requires another vital aspect of reality testing. I refer here to
the ability to recognize mental contents that originate from inside as con-
tent from inside, for example, dream-percepts, waking imaginations, hallu-
cinatory-percepts—and to distinguish these content types from content
from outside, such as awake percepts and awake beliefs-proper that arise
from these percepts.
Let’s look at the four criteria for beliefs-proper to see if dream-beliefs can
qualify. (1) It is clear from the foregoing that no dream-cognitive states
can meet the reality-testing requirement of experiencing mental content
within the proper propositional attitude type. Because dream-beliefs are
dreamed as beliefs-proper, they fail this reality-testing task. (2) Dream-be-
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liefs cannot match the dream-beliefs’ truth conditions with conditions ob-
taining in the world of the dream, much less those obtaining in the world.
(3) In terms of the separation of cognitive states from conative states neces-
sary for genuine beliefs-proper, dream-beliefs have no independence from
underlying wishes and desires. Returning to my dream of convenience, the
dream-belief that I have gone to the delivery room is inextricably linked
with my desire not to be awakened to work in the middle of the night. That
other latent wishes were likely present, too, follows from Freud’s (1900–
1901/1962a) posit that every dream consists in wishes, more or less dis-
guised, more or less fulfilled (see pp. 122–133, esp. p. 122; pp. 134–162,
esp. p. 135; and pp. 550–572). But, we need not support Freud’s claim
here. All that is needed to make the current point is to establish that a
dream-belief can still be a dream-belief and yet have no independence
from wishes or desires, whatever other wishes and desires may be latent.
(4) Finally, do dream-beliefs have the same special relationship to actions
that beliefs-proper do? This is the easiest matter of all. Of course they do
not; during REM sleep volitional actions, routine and normal during waking
states, cannot take place. The consequences of this can vary. As I remained
in my bed asleep while I had the dream-belief that I was going to the deliv-
ery room, I did not make a very good impression as a medical student. On
the other hand, once when Dr. C reported a dream in which he was being
slugged by a thug and finally took out a knife and stabbed his attacker, no
one was physically harmed.
Having examined the four criteria necessary for genuine belief-proper, a
cognitive attitude requiring development through the second stage, we can
conclude that no dream-cognitive state, including dream-beliefs, meet the
criteria. This really amounts to no more than Freud’s (1900–1901/1962a)
understanding of speeches, calculations, judgments and other secondary
process highly rational cognitive operations within dreams. Freud held that
these contents, organized internally in a secondary process fashion, were
appropriated by the primary process organized dream-work, much as vari-
ous newspaper clippings can be appended whole cloth within a collage.
He stated, “ . . . the dream-work does not in fact carry out any calcula-
tions at all . . . the dreamwork cannot actually create speeches” (p. 418).
He continues:
Everything that appears in dreams as the ostensible activity of the function of
judgement is to be regarded not as an intellectual achievement of the dream-
work but as belonging to the material of the dream-thoughts and having been
lifted from them into the manifest content of the dream as a ready made struc-
ture.12 (p. 445)
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UNCONSCIOUS CONTENTS AND COGNITIVE STATES
Freud found the dreaming state especially revealing in a number of ways.
Although dreamers are clearly experiencing mental contents—and in this
sense “conscious of” their mental contents—dreamers are not in alert
wakeful consciousness.13 But dreamers, unlike anesthetized patients, are
not unconscious. Yet, Freud (1900–1901/1962a, pp. 279–309, 588–609,
610–621) hypothesized that dream mental contents and dream cognitive
states resembled those mental contents and cognitive states he inferred to
exist in unconsciousness. He posited that a predominantly primary process
organization characterized both types of mentation. To the extent that
Freud is right, we would expect all unconscious mental content states to
have the usual primary process problems with reality testing capacities.
Moreover since by definition unconscious mental content cannot be experi-
enced and there is thus no consciousness of the content, there be no assess-
ment of the content as a cognitive state. Thus, the disagreement between
Shevrin (1986) and me (Brakel, 1989) dissolves; we concur that these un-
conscious cognitive states cannot be differentiated according to type, as
they cannot even be experienced. This would be the case for contents that
have never been in consciousness and even for those sophisticated second-
ary process mediated cognitive states (such as genuine beliefs-proper) once
in consciousness and now repressed. In fact, Shevrin (1988) has suggested
that along with rendering mental content unconscious, repression “removes
the tag” from mental contents as it disables the capacity to ascribe mental
content to particular cognitive states. Thus when content is unconscious, it
is incoherent to suggest that any typing as to its cognitive state origin is
possible. Even gross distinctions between inner content states vs. outer ones
cannot be made.
Finally, let’s look at the effects that unconscious contents and cognitive
states can have on actions. Unlike the situation with dream-cognitive states
in which motor paralysis inhibits actions, actions are indeed the possible
effects of all sorts of unconscious contents and unconscious cognitive state
causes. Unlike the case that with alert-awake-conscious cognitive states
where only beliefs-proper mediate effective actions, any type of uncon-
scious content or cognitive state can lead to actions of all kinds. The conse-
quent behavioral unpredictability is thereby not at all unpredicted from a
theoretical viewpoint!
Having examined the four criteria for genuine belief-proper, it is obvious
that no unconscious contents or cognitive state types should be considered
at the second developmental stage. The more sophisticated second stage
requires (1) reality testing of the mental content in terms of conditions in
the world, (2) proper ascription of the cognitive state to its cognitive state
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type, (3) a separation of beliefs from conative propositional states (wish,
desire), and (4) a unique mediating role with respect to effective actions in
the world. Unconscious contents and cognitive state types do not meet any
of these criteria.
CONFOUNDS
Dream-beliefs, neurotic-beliefs, and the unconscious contents of the
multilevel, multidetermined, complex, central phantasies contributing to
those neurotic-beliefs are all quite different from beliefs-proper. And yet, as
very frequently happens, they all are acted on as though they were genuine
beliefs-proper. During dreaming and outside of consciousness the mental
contents of dream- and unconscious cognitive states cannot be properly
assigned and contents fixed within their appropriate cognitive state type.
Hence, confusions in proper typing that become apparent in the later wake-
ful conscious condition are predictable. It is further predictable that more
frequent and more profound confusions arise regarding unconscious con-
tents than with dream-cognitive states, since mental contents within dream-
cognitive states do regularly admit of some correct ascriptions to type after
the dreamer has awakened. Mental contents that are unconscious, on the
other hand, cannot be properly typed at all, even when these contents are
causing actions in alert wakefulness. But, why are the confusions in the
direction of taking dream-beliefs or unconscious contents as beliefs?14
The short answer is that awake adult human thinkers have a default man-
ner of gaining understanding. Our default awake mode utilizes secondary
process mediated mental operations rather than primary process ones, rely-
ing on basic principles of logic such as noncontradiction, as well as various
reality testing skills. Hence, in the service of putting content in a form that
mature human thinkers find most workable, much mental content gets re-
configured to conform with the propositional attitude of belief-proper.
Some evidence for this default operation comes from our human reac-
tions to the cognitive world of frogs. Frogs rapidly zip out their tongues
whenever small black insects are within their visual fields. Frogs are quite
successful in capturing and then quickly swallowing these little black bugs.
A not uninteresting fact. More interesting still is that frogs will repeatedly
react in just the same way to little black pellets called BBs. They will zip
out their tongues, capture, and swallow endless BBs or endless bugs, indis-
criminately. What is going on for these frogs? Is it, as many contend (includ-
ing the philosophers Dennett, 1987, and Fodor, 1986), that the frogs (1)
want bugs; (2) have beliefs-proper that BBs are bugs; and, therefore, (3) go
for every bug and BB? If this were so, frogs engaged in this behavior would
be demonstrating the capacity to make correct inferences and to have genu-
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ine (albeit in this case false) beliefs-proper. Perhaps from this viewpoint the
frog cognitive problem would be diagnosed as an overinclusive category
for bug. The other alternative is that frogs have a reflex-like reaction when-
ever a dark object of a certain size appears. If this is the correct explanation,
when it comes to bugs and BBs successful frogs probably have full bellies,
but no beliefs-proper and no inference processes.15
Despite the fact that the latter explanation requires far less speculative
baggage and is thereby a better bet, humans find it irresistible to impart
beliefs-proper and the capacity for beliefs-proper to others once they them-
selves have reached what has been referred to here as the second develop-
mental stage. Adult humans tend to attribute the a full-blown capacity for
genuine beliefs-proper not only to various creatures in the animal world16
but to their own unconscious and dream states, as well as to very young
children clearly operating at the first stage of development.
More Complex Confounds
The situation with neurotic-beliefs experienced and acted on as though
they were beliefs-proper is even more complex. If, as I have proposed, neu-
rotic-beliefs are core phantasies plus evidence and knowledge gained from
psychic-reality testing (as opposed to reality testing), the natural tendency to
ascribe content from various cognitive states to beliefs-proper will be added
to by the performance of these distorted tests of reality. While it is a given
that general reality testing is not without its psychic-reality component and
that, therefore, in some sense there is no reality that is not psychic-reality
mediated, it is also the case that in general, tests of reality contributions from
the consensual objective world outside oneself modulate and overrule many
idiosyncratic psychic-reality verdicts. On the other hand, the character of the
evidence and knowledge gained to support neurotic-beliefs makes clear that
with respect to this class of propositional attitudes, it is the conflict laden,
primary process organized psychic-reality testing that predominates. The ac-
tions yielding psychic-reality based evidence for these neurotic-beliefs feel
no different to the holder of these neurotic-beliefs from his/her actions pro-
ducing reality based evidence with respect to propositional attitudes typed
correctly as beliefs-proper. Thus, the holder of a particular neurotic-belief
classifies it as a belief-proper, not only in accord with the default natural
tendency to do so but deliberately and with assurance!
Consequences of the Confounds
If beliefs-proper are attributed to frogs when they really don’t have the
capacity for genuine beliefs, no harm is done. Of more importance is the
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tendency adults have to adultomorphize children, which perhaps leads to
unreasonable expectations and short parental patience, and certainly inhib-
its true empathic understanding. Relatedly, regarding aspects of our own
mentation, we humans tend to assume more secondary process organiza-
tion than is warranted in a number of ways. For example, we frequently
assume that various awake cognitive states (including perceptions, memo-
ries, imaginations, beliefs, etc.) are independent of our conative states
(wish, desire) when clearly they are not.17 This assumption is closely related
to one of the central thesis of this paper, namely that we often mis (type)
dream-cognitive states, unconscious contents and states, and waking com-
plex phantasy states (including the phantasy-plus states of neurotic-beliefs),
all as beliefs-proper. Looking generally at this sort of classification mistake,
we can see it has far-reaching consequences. Because beliefs-proper,
unique among the propositional attitudes, have a role toward selecting and
causing effective actions and behaviors in the world, when mental contents
and propositional attitudes other than those of beliefs-proper are treated as
beliefs-proper, actions and behaviors result that are not effective (to say the
least). What this amounts to is a very rudimentary account, derived from
a philosophical analysis of the different cognitive states and propositional
attitudes, of why neurosis are usually so detrimental.
Before concluding, I want to make a brief, practical point. The very clas-
sification mistake we have been examining here has resulted in raising un-
warranted hopes about cognitive behavioral treatment. Indeed, when it is
the case that people are suffering from false beliefs-proper, cognitive behav-
ioral therapy should (and often does) work. False beliefs-proper are genuine
beliefs-proper; they just are wrong. But for many patients, erroneous and
false beliefs-proper are not the problem. For people like my sample three
patients, the problem is better characterized as four-layered: (1) there are
the unconscious conflicts involved in the content of the core, complex pha-
ntasy; (2) psychic-reality testing (rather than reality testing) yields evidence
for distorted knowledge concerning the content of the phantasy; (3) there
is a mistyping of the resultant neurotic-belief as a belief-proper; and (4)
such neurotic-beliefs are not merely experienced as beliefs-proper, but ac-
ted on as such. For problems of this sort, no amount of cognitive behavioral
therapy can work. Perhaps an analogy with the frog situation will help
clarify why. If frogs merely had the false belief-proper that BBs were bugs,
if they had an overinclusive category, one would find that frogs experi-
enced with both bugs and BBs would, after some training, learn to modify
the category and appreciate the difference. After all, on many external crite-
ria that frogs are sensitive to (taste, weight, texture), bugs are rather different
from lead BB pellets. But, frogs will ingest countless numbers of both bugs
and BBs, despite intensive and extensive cognitive-behavioral training at-
tempts. Cognitive-behavioral training can change false and erroneous be-
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liefs-proper. It cannot address a matter such as a hard-wired category born
of a reflex-like proclivity to react to everything that is even potentially food.
This is a matter at a different level. For each of my patients, too, the prob-
lem is at a different level from than that of false belief-proper. The complex,
partly unconscious, multilevel, multidetermined, central phantasies plus the
psychic-reality testing derived knowledge of their content that Drs. A, B,
and C each experience as beliefs-proper—are not simply false beliefs-
proper. For all three of these patients (and presumably for many others
like them) these are neurotic-beliefs—not beliefs-proper at all. Treatment
attempting to address these phantasy laden, primary process mediated, neu-
rotic-beliefs as though they were false beliefs-proper will be a misguided
treatment, for it is predicated on one of the very sources of the problem—
the mistyping of various cognitive states and propositional attitudes that are
not beliefs-proper as beliefs-proper.
CONCLUSION
I have written an interdisciplinary paper, interdisciplinary in two direc-
tions. In one direction, using the philosophical method of consistent, care-
ful distinction and even using philosophical technical definitions, some in-
creased clarity has been provided with regard to phantasy, neurotic-belief,
and other important propositional attitude and cognitive state types fre-
quently seen in doing psychoanalysis. In this way, a philosophical analysis
provides the clinical theory of psychoanalysis with something of value.
From the other direction, psychoanalytic clinical concepts about phantasy,
neurotic-belief, and unconscious contents—when properly specified—can
contribute much to a general theory of mind and to the discipline of philos-
ophy of mind. In the current climate, most philosophers of mind claim that
conscious and rational propositional attitudes comprise the great majority
of representational contentful mental states. We as psychoanalysts know
that that view is inadequate. In every patient, in every session, we not only
assume unconscious contents and various unconscious cognitive states, we
deal directly with propositional attitudes that clearly refer to content and
yet are primary process mediated—a-rational, or irrational—façades of ra-
tionality notwithstanding. It is important that we be able to communicate
this knowledge.
ENDNOTES
1. That such a philosophical analysis would benefit psychoanalytic clinicians was suggested
by Dr. Jack Novick (personal communication).
2. This was unbelievable to me, as I am sure it will be to other psychoanalysts. I have
attempted to make a philosophical case for primary process (a-rational) mental states with
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referring representational content in an article intended for philosophers (see Brakel, in
press).
3. I will not, however, take up the very interesting and complicated story of how phantasies,
particularly unconscious phantasies embodying various important unconscious conflicts,
become structured and organized as central to the formation and maintenance of individ-
ual neuroses. This area has been amply and ably discussed in the literature from the
classic works of Freud (see especially 1905 [1901]/1962b, 1906 [1905]/1962c, 1909/
1962d, 1916, and 1919/1962f), to the modern extension of this view by Arlow (1985,
1991a, 1991b, and 1996), and with respect to developmental considerations by Novick
and Novick (1996), to provide but a very incomplete list.
4. From this very simple example the most important difference between a wish and a phan-
tasy can be appreciated. A phantasy, even in its most basic form, always has mental
content such that a wish (or set of wishes) is represented as fulfilled. Wishes can exist in
unfulfilled, not-yet-fulfilled, and even unfulfillable forms.
5. By contentful I mean mental content that is about something; namely, that the mental
content represents and refers to something.
6. Wimmer and Perner (1983) did a classic experiment demonstrating that the ability to
pretend to be in another’s shoes comes after the ability to form beliefs-proper. Children
were shown a puppet play in which a puppet named Maxi first puts some candies in a
box and then goes out to play. While he is out playing, the mother puppet moves the
candies to the cupboard. Children are asked where Maxi will look for the candies on his
return. Five-year-olds have no trouble indicating that Maxi will look for the candies in
the box where he left them. But three- and four-year-olds more often indicate that Maxi
will look for the candies in the cupboard. These children have a correct belief-proper that
the candies are in the cupboard where the mother puppet has put them, but they cannot
pretend to be in Maxi’s position—they cannot pretend to be in the position of one who
does not have this belief-proper.
As interesting as these findings are, this experiment should not be taken to indicate that
the ability to pretend is an all-or-none ability. Rather, what is suggested is that while all
three groups of children showed the capacity for true beliefs-proper, the five-year-olds,
more than the three- and four-year-olds, demonstrated the capacity for sophisticated pre-
tending.
7. The distinction between this second type of imagining and phantasizing can be tricky.
How can we distinguish between choosing to suspend one’s capacity for reality testing
in having a phantasy that X is at the gym vs. choosing not to reality test the imagination
that X is at the gym. I contend that there is an important difference. In the example of
imagining something, the imaginer is always aware not only of what is imagined but also
of “imagining,” of having a particular type of propositional attitude, an imagination. In
phantasizing something, however, one is aware only of the content of the phantasy, not
of the particular propositional attitude “phantasizing.” Thus, take entities that cannot ex-
ist—impossible geometrical figures, the current King of France, a golden mountain, and
so on. These impossible entities can be imagined or phantasized. When I imagine these
entities, I am aware that I am imagining, and because I am aware that I am imagining
(and not having beliefs-proper), I am not troubled that these entities may be impossible.
When I phantasize about these same impossible entities, since genuine phantasizing re-
quires either the suspension or insufficient development of reality-testing capacities, I am
aware only of these entities—entities that happen to be impossible—while I have aware-
ness neither of the reality status of these entities nor that the propositional attitude I am
engaging in is phantasizing. (See the next section and the section on dream-beliefs for
fuller explanations.)
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8. Analogously, Novick and Novick (2000) hold that playing is not really possible without
an understanding that the play differs from reality, in other words, that the play is play (p.
203).
9. Supposing can be considered an intellectual type of imagining and pretending. As with
pretending and the first type of imagining, something (X) can be supposed-as-true, even
when the supposer knows X to be not true. As with the second type of imagining, some-
thing can be supposed-as-true even choosing not to investigate X’s relation to truth or
falsity.
10. This recognition of a desire as a desire means that when someone desires sexual satisfac-
tion, for example, he/she not only realizes that “sex” is on his/her mind but also realizes
that he/she “wants something, in this case, sex.” The realization that one wants something
has implications for evaluating actions leading toward fulfillment. As will be explored in
the body of the text below, the case is different for wishes. The awareness of a wish as a
wish can be absent.
11. He has at times held the neurotic-belief that he is part male and part female, with reality
testing supplanted by the psychic-reality “evidence” that his hips and skin are really femi-
nine.
12. Dr. Althea Horner, in reviewing this article, raised an extremely interesting potential coun-
terexample to my view of dream-beliefs. She reminded me that often in typical anxiety
dreams, the dreamer soothes him-/herself within the dream with true assertions like, “But
I already have my Ph.D.” This brought to my mind another type of potential counterexam-
ple: the dreams in which the dreamer dreams the true statement, “But I’m only dreaming.”
Yet, if we follow Freud in the above quotation, we might understand both of these as
cases in which secondary process true beliefs-proper (rather than dream-beliefs) have
been appended to the dream in the service of the primary process dream-wish(es). Thus,
since in the typical anxiety dream one wishes that some feared future situation would
work out as well as some long past accomplishment already has, and since the primary
process dream-work involves disguising by displacement the future event with the past
one, insertion of the belief-proper regarding the past success assuages the dreamer partly
by keeping the displacement in place. A similar analysis can be made for dreams where
the dreamer dreams, “This is only a dream.” While it happens to be a fact and a true
belief-proper, this particular true belief can fit the needs of the dream-wishes, too. Thus,
for example, “It’s only a dream” can allow all sorts of otherwise forbidden dream wishes
to continue being fulfilled within the dream.
13. For a full discussion of these two aspects of “consciousness,” awake alertness, and con-
sciousness of, and their different roles see Shevrin (1986) and Brakel (1989).
14. Strictly speaking, it is only from the perspective of waking consciousness that the bias
goes as stated. Unconscious contents of various sorts and sources, either never conscious
or repressed, as well as awake perceptions, desires, imaginations, and beliefs-proper can
appear within dreams as dream-propositional attitudes of various types. Likewise, con-
tents originating from any type of awake cognitive state presumably can, when outside of
consciousness, exist in various and perhaps shifting unconscious cognitive state types.
Yet, this not withstanding, we are more capable of studying phenomena from the perspec-
tive of conscious wakefulness. In the alert, wakeful, conscious state we know there are
serious consequences of taking unconscious mental contents (and dream-mental contents)
from various cognitive state types and acting on such contents as though they were con-
scious awake beliefs-proper.
15. This sort of hard-wired reflex-like operation can certainly yield evolutionary success pro-
vided that overinclusive eating of black things doesn’t (1) prove toxic and (2) doesn’t
preclude the ingestion of real food. Indeed, it should not be ruled out that frogs have a
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genuine concept or category constituted by their reflex-like activity—a concept we might
name “black things to eat.” Note that from a frog’s viewpoint, such a category would not
be overinclusive.
16. That frogs are unlikely to have genuine beliefs-proper, in no way implies that frogs are
not capable cognizers. They can form perceptual representations that are predictable and
meaningful reductions of the external world such that in conjunction with inputs from
within, often instinctually driven, frogs can perform actions leading to biological success
in terms of nutrition, survival, and reproduction. Frogs can also learn, and as discussed
in the footnote 15, it is certainly possible that they have concepts and categories. What I
am questioning is the notion that frogs can operate at the largely secondary process medi-
ated level necessary for genuine beliefs. I speculate instead that their cognitive organiza-
tion (including the sort of categories they form) is likely more similar to our primary
process mediated and less developed mentation.
17. Not even taking up the ubiquitous influence of unconscious and conflictual wishes, it is
clear that conscious desires have great influence not only on imaginations, memories,
and beliefs but also on basic perceptions. A very simple study by McClelland and Atkin-
son (1948) was done in which two groups of subjects—one group desiring food and very
hungry and the other group not hungry—were asked to describe what they saw when
they were presented what was actually just blobs or smudges on a screen. The hungrier
group “saw” food items significantly more often than did the other group.
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